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
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2. FRENCH WILL LIMIT AIR SUPPORT OF LAOTIAN ARMY IF HOSTILITIES FLARE UP



The American embassy notes that the situation could become critical any time after 11 October, the break-off date for government-Pathet Lao negotiations, and fears that last-minute qualms in Paris on the use of French planes might lead to fatal delays.

The Laotian forces in the two northern provinces are almost wholly dependent on air supply which has been provided by French C-47's. During a Pathet attack in July, the French refused to fly in reinforcements and commercial planes were chartered at heavy cost. Not enough of these are


immediately available for full-scale support.

In August the commander of the French air force in the Far East reportedly stated that French air support of the Laotian army would be withdrawn in the event of a major conflict with the Pathets.

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3. COMMENT ON WITHDRAWAL OF FRANCE'S UN DELEGATION



sprang more from immediate domestic political reasons than from France's long-standing objection to what it regards as international interference in a strictly internal problem. There is little likelihood that France will sever its UN ties, and the delegation may still return to this session of the General Assembly after the Algerian debate is over.

Premier Faure was probably relieved to have an excuse for a forceful step which will be backed by most Frenchmen. France strongly resents foreign criticism of its conduct in North Africa, and most non-Communist elements can be expected to rally to Faure's support on this issue. The premier will be the target of some attacks on the ground that his vacillation on both Morocco and Algeria brought on the General Assembly's action, but most of the pressure will be directed toward hastening an Algerian political solution entirely under French auspices.

At the UN, the General Assembly can probably go no further than debate on the Algerian question, since any resolutions or recommendations require approval by two thirds of the members present and voting. France's withdrawal from the UN subcommittee on disarmament will have little immediate effect since the subcommittee had already tentatively decided to recess on 8 October until after the Geneva conference.

In Algeria, the General Assembly's action probably will strengthen nationalist opposition to French policy. Terrorists and rebels will probably increase their activities in an effort to influence UN debate.

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4. FURTHER DELAY SEEN IN MOROCCAN SETTLEMENT DESPITE SULTAN'S DEPARTURE

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	The American embassy in Paris does not think that Sultan Mohamed ben Arafa's departure from Rabat means Immediate institution of a council of
	the throne in Morocco-the next step in the reform pro-
	gram for Morocco. The embassy believes that Resident General Latour won rightist acquiescence in Ben Arafa's
	removal only by concessions on the throne council.

Comment The Moroccan nationalists will probably refuse to accept any change in the throne council agreement reached in their conference with Premier Faure at Aix-les-Bains in September.

American officials in Morocco estimate that the nationalists by mid-October could again be in position for large-scale demonstrations.

The rate at which Faure implements the remaining provisions of the Aix-les-Bains agreements will probably be determined by the reaction of the nationalists. He will seek National Assembly approval of his Moroccan program, asking for patience pending its completion and relying on the assembly's reluctance to oust him while France's Algerian policy is under attack from abroad.

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5. COMMENT ON INDONESIAN ELECTION RETURNS

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	The substantial lead piled up by the
	Indonesian National Party on the basis
	of unofficial returns from about one
third of	a total of 80,000 polling stations points to the pos-
	establishment of a Communist-supported govern-
ment in	Indonesia. The National Party, which has ac-
	-operated with the Communists since mid-1952,
	first place in the provisional national count as
	It of its heavy vote in Central Java. The Commu-
	o did well in Central Java, and so far hold a
	nird place in the national count. In fourth place
	hdlatul Ulama, a Moslem party which is sup-
	he present government but which supported the
	Party in the previous government.

Central Java is the home of President Sukarno, who has largely identified himself with the National Party. It is also a stronghold of nationalist sentiment, on which the National Party apparently capitalized.

The Masjumi, the Moslem party which leads the present government, had been confident of winning a plurality, but held only a narrow lead before the Central Java returns were counted. It is now running second in the national count. Available reports do not indicate what part of the total so far counted is from East Java, the country's most populous district and a Moslem stronghold. Even if the Masjumi regains its plurality, however, it is likely to be a small one, and its political allies, on the basis of the present count, are polling badly.

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